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Extended Abstract
We conside r the issue of patent licensing in a linear city framework where firms are located
at the end points of the city and compete in price. We focus on the optimal licensing strategy
of an outsider patentee (independent innovator) as well as an insider patentee (incumbent
innovator). In the case of outsider patentee where the patentee faces two competing firms,
considers three types of licensing arrangements to offer, namely, auction, fixed fee and
royalty. We show that auction and fixed fee yield equivalent payoff to the patentee, and only
one of the competitors is offered with the license irrespective of the nature of innovation i.e.
drastic or non-drastic. On the other hand, in the case of royalty licensing both the competing
firms are offered with the license irrespective of the nature of innovation. Moreover, contrary
to the findings of the existing literature on patent licensing when the patentee is an outsider,
we show royalty licensing is better compared to auction or fixed fee as it always yields higher
payoff to the patentee. In the case of insider patentee with a rival competitor, we find
licensing by means of royalty is superior to no licensing or fixed fee licensing to the patentee
when the innovation is non-drastic. When the innovation is drastic no licensing is optimal to
the patentee. We also focus our attention to the much debated issue of incentive for
innovation and show that in a spatial framework like this, incentive for innovation is higher
for an outsider patentee compared to an insider patentee. Finally, we do some welfare
analysis where show that overall increase in welfare due to innovation is independent of the
fact that the patentee is outsider or insider in each of the drastic and non-drastic case.
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1. Introduction
Patent licensing is a fairly common practice that takes place in almost all industries. It
is a source of profit for the innovator (also called patentee) who earns rent through licensing a
patent. The most common modes of patent licensing are: a royalty on per unit of output
produced w ith the patented technology, a fixed fee that is independent of the quantity
produced with the patented technology, or auction certain number of licenses i.e. offering a
fixed number of licenses to the highest bidders. There is a vast literature (see Kamein (1992)
for a survey on this) which studied the optimal licensing arrangement by the patentee in a
wide variety of situations, and at the same time , studies are devoted to analyze various
aspects of patent licensing. For example, when the patentee is an outsider as opposed to an
insider, or when the competition among the rival firms or the potential licensees take place in
prices or quantities, incentives for innovation of the patentee, or the type of industry structure
where all these issues are considered, whether it is a single -firm industry, oligopolistic one or
a competitive industry. Interestingly, to the best of our knowledge, all these studies are done
in a standard framework of price and quantity competition. In this article, we introduce the
study on patent licensing in a spatial framework. The fact that so far no study on patent
licensing is done in spatial framework is somewhat surprising as in general, spatial
competition is a major area of research in the industrial organization theory, and more
specifically , in the area where firms behave strategically. Hence, to fill up this void, in this
paper, we discuss some aspects of optimal patent licensing to a particular spatial framework,
namely, the very well-known Hotelling’s linear city model. We study the optimal licensing
behavior (strategy) of an outsider patentee as well as an insider patentee in this new
environment and contrast our findings with the existing results in the patent licensing
literature. We find significant differences in the licensing outcomes arise due to the specific
form of spatial competition we consider here. We believe this makes our study a fruitful
exercise and opens up a new avenue of research in patent licensing.
We consider the issue of outsider patentee and the insider patentee in turn. When the patentee
is an outsider, it faces two firms, i.e. the two potential licensees, who are engaged in a price
competition a la Bertrand , and located at the two end points of the linear city. On the other
hand, when the patentee is an insider, it is also a competitor in the product market, and we
assume it competes with a rival firm in price. Here also both firms are located at the end
points of the city. In each of this case, the locations of the competing firms are fixed and both
firms produce a homogenous good. Consumers are uniformly distributed over the linear city,
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and willing to buy exactly one unit of the good. In this framework, we do our analysis of
patent licensing and find the optimal strategy of the patentee in offering the license(s).
Following the literature on patent licensing on the technology side , we consider two types of
innovations, namely, drastic and non-drastic . We completely characterize the equilibrium
licensing outcomes in each of this case, under different possible licensing arrangements of
auction, fixed fee and royalty.
Earlier much has been discussed in the literature about the nature of licensing that should
take place. In the standard models, in a complete information framework1 if the patentee
happens to be an outsider, it is shown that a fixed fee licensing is better than per unit royalty
licensing (see Kamien and Tauman (1986), Katz and Shapiro (1986), Kamien, Oren and
Tauman (1992), Kamien (1992) among others), and the reverse happen when the patentee is
an insider i.e. a competitor (see Wang (1998, 2002) Wang and Yang (1999), Kamien and
Tauman (2002)). In this paper, we show the existing result in the literature about the outsider
patentee is not true when we consider licensing in a spatial framework of linear city. We find
offering royalty licensing is always better than fixed fee or auction. Muto (1993) considered
licensing policies under price competition in a standard framework, and like us assumed an
external patentee who is willing to offer licensing contract when two potential licensees are
competing in prices in a differentiated product market. Muto’s main result was royalty is
superior to other two polices, namely fixed fee and auction, when innovations are not large
i.e. the innovation is non-drastic. In this framework, we find royalty is always superior to
other two policies irrespective of the nature of innovation i.e. whether it is drastic or nondrastic. Another interesting feature which we note here is that in the case of outsider patentee
licensing takes place even if the innovation is drastic. This is a result that has never been
shown in the literature before with an outsider patentee.2 On the other hand, as far as
incentive for innovations by the patentee is concerned, in this analysis, we find that incentive
for innovation is always higher when the patentee is an outsider as compared to an insider.
This result is in some contrast with the result obtained in Kamien and Tauman (2002), where
they show in a Cournot market structure with two firms, the incentive for innovation is higher
for an insider patentee than an outsider patentee. We also find interesting welfare and policy
implications. We show that overall increase in welfare due to innovation is independent of
the fact that the patentee is outsider or insider in each of the drastic and non-drastic case. This
1

For the patent licensing in an incomplete information framework, see Beggs (1992), Gallini and Wright
(1990), Choi (2001), Poddar and Sinha (2002) among others.
2
In the case of an insider patentee, similar result does exist, see Wang and Yang (1999).
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also implies that given a degree of innovation, the policy on advocating an outsider or an
insider patentee is neutral from the society’s point of view. Although, we show consumers are
better off if the innovation comes from the insider patentee. 3 The consume r surplus remains
unaffected when the innovation is done by an outsider patentee.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the basic framework. Section
3 considers the case of an outsider patentee. Section 4 considers the case of insider patentee.
In section 5, we discuss about the incentive for innovations by the patentee. In section 6, we
do some welfare analysis, and finally, we conclude in section 7.

2. The Basic Framework
Consider a linear city along the unit interval [0, 1], where firm A is located at 0 and firm B is
located at 1 i.e. at the two extremes. Consumers are uniformly distributed along the interval.
Each consumer buys exactly one unit of good. The utility of the consumer located at x ∈ [0,1]
is given by4
u x = − x − p A if buys from A

= − (1 − x) − p B if buys from B

We derive the demand for firm A and firm B by equating the utility of the person who is
indifferent between buying from A or B and obtain:

DA =

p B − p A +1
p − pB + 1
and DB = A
2
2

Assume the existing marginal cost of production for firm A and firm B are c A > 0 , cB > 0
respectively.
If these two firms compete in price, the equilibrium prices, demand and profits are given by:
pA =

2c A + cB
2c + c A
+1, pB = B
+1;
3
3

(1)

DA =

cB − c A + 3
c − cB + 3
, DB = A
;
6
6

(2)

πA =

(c B − cA + 3)2
18

, πB =

(c A − cB + 3)2

(3)

18

3

Of course, as we said before, the incentive to innovate for any degree of cost reduction is always higher for the
outsider patentee compared to an insider patentee.
4
This particular formulation of the utility function in a Hotelling’s linear city model is typical, see Shy (1996,
2000), Shy and Thisse (1999) among others.
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3. The Case of Outsider Patentee
Let’s assume pre-innovation marginal costs of the existing firms are c A = c B = c . An outsider
patentee (independent innovator) comes up with a cost reducing innovation, which could
lower the marginal cost by ε > 0 . We say that the innovation is drastic if one firm buys the
license while the other firm does not then the unlicensed firm is unable to compete anymore
and goes out of business. For example, if firm A buys the license and firm B does not, then
because of competitive disadvantage D B becomes 0 , and as a result firm A serves the whole
market i.e. D A becomes 1. This is the case when the innovation is drastic. Whereas in case of
non-drastic innovation, in spite of cost disadvantage, D B still remains positive after firm A
becomes the only license holder. Now, using the equilibrium demand (from (1)), the above is
same as saying as long as 0 < ε < 3 , the innovation is non-drastic and whenε ≥ 3 , the
innovation is drastic.

3.1 The Licensing Game
The outsider patentee has got three licensing policies to offer : auction, fixed fee, and royalty.
We consider a three stage game where in the first stage the patentee decides on a licensing
policy among the above three policies and announces the number of license to be offered. In
the second stage the firms simultaneously and independently decides whether to accept or
reject the offer in case of fee and royalty policy, or they simultaneously bid for license in case
of auction. And in the third stage the firms compete in price in the market depending on the
availability of the technology inherited from the second stage of the licensing game. We
focus on the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. We first consider the policy of
auction.

3.1.1 Auction Policy
In case of auction in the first stage the outside patentee decides whether to auction one or two
licenses. In case of selling two licenses the patentee has to fix the minimum price for the bids.
We will analyze two cases i.e. non-drastic and drastic innovation in turn.
3.1.1.1 Non Drastic Case ( 0 < ε < 3 )
(i) First, consider the case of one license being auctioned. Then in the second stage the two
firms bid and the highest bidder is awarded the license. In case of a tie , the patentee chooses
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the licensee at random. In this auction we can calculate the bid any firm will be willing to
make for the license. In case of success a firm will produce with that technology and the rival
firm produces with the old technology in the third stage of the game. As a result, the licensee
(L) and the non licensee (NL) get the payoff
πL =

(3 + ε )2
18

and π NL =

(3 − ε )2
18

(use equation 3 in section 2 to derive these expressions)

Thus, a firm would always be willing to bid the difference between these two payoffs and
one of the firms will be awarded the license at random. Thus, auctioning one license , the
outside r patentee receive s

2
ε.
3

(ii) Now suppose instead of one license the outside patentee decides to issue two licenses in
auction. Then the patentee has to fix a minimum bid and any firm bidding higher than that
amount would be awarded the license. In case of both firms being awarded the license the
output market competition will have two firms with the same technological capability and
thus the payoff to the each firm will be

1
. In case a firm does not bid higher than the
2

minimum bid, but it s rival bids higher than the minimum bid then the payoff to the non
licensee is π NL =

(3 − ε )2 . Thus, a non licensee would always bid for the technology if the
18

1 (3 − ε )
−
. Thus, with this minimum bidding price, both
2
18
2

minimum bid is not greater than

firms will bid and receive the license and therefore the patentee would receive the pay off
1−

(3 − ε )2
9

.

Lemma 1
By comparing the payoffs from auctioning of one and two licenses, we find that auctioning off
one license is strictly better than the auctioning off two licenses when the innovation is nondrastic.
3.1.1.2 Drastic Case ( ε ≥ 3 )
(i) If one firm is offered the technology in auction then any firm would bid (ε − 1) as the
unsuccessful firm will go out of business and earn zero profit. The market will be served by
the successful firm under monopoly and the optimal price charged by the firm is (c − 1) . Thus,
6

by auctioning one license when the technology is drastic the pate ntee receives the payoff

(ε − 1) .
(ii) Suppose the patentee decides to offer two licenses under auction. Then the minimum
bidding price has to be such that both firm prefers to bid than no bidding. Note that once both
licenses are granted then in the third stage of the game both firms will earn a profit

1
each.
2

And a firm gets zero if it does not bid for the technology. Thus each firm would be willing to
pay at the most

1
. Thus by offering two licenses under auction the patentee receives
2

1 1
+ =1
2 2

Lemma 2
By comparing the payoffs from auctioning of one and two licenses we find that auctioning off
one license is strictly better than the auctioning off two licenses when the innovation is
drastic.

Here, we summarize the outcome under auction policy.

Proposition 1
Under auction policy, the outside patentee always offers one license irrespective of the
amount of cost reduction. In case of non-drastic innovation the patentee receives

2
ε and in
3

case of drastic innovation it receives (ε − 1) .

3.1.2 Fixed Fee Policy
In the first stage of our licensing game the patentee announces whether it wants to offer one
or two licenses and the corresponding fees. In the second stage firms decides whether to
accept or not, and in the third stage they compete in price.
3.1.2.1 Non Drastic Case ( 0 < ε < 3 )
(i) Suppose the outside patentee decides to issue one license. Then the most the patentee can
charge as fixed fee is

2
ε . The argument is same as in the auction case 3.1.1.1 (i).
3

7

(ii) In case the patentee decides to issue two licenses then the amount it can charge to each
party is what is the minimum bid fixed in case of auctioning two licenses, which is
1 (3 − ε )
(3 − ε ) .
−
. Therefore the patentee would receive the payoff 1 −
2
18
9
2

2

3.1.2.2 Drastic Case ( ε ≥ 3 )
(i) Suppose the outside patentee decides to issue one license. Then the most the patentee can
charge as fixed fee is ε − 1 . Same argument as in auction in 3.1.1.2 (i).
(ii) In case the patentee decides to issue two licenses then the amount it can charge to each
party is

1
. Therefore , the patentee would receive the payoff of 1. See 3.1.1.2 (ii).
2

Proposition 2
In the case of fixed fee, the outsider patentee would always offer one license irrespective of
the amount of cost reduction and the patentee receives the same amount as in the auction
case. Thus, we show that fixed fee policy and auction policy are equivalent.

3.1.3. Royalty Policy
In case of royalty policy the patentee charges a payment scheme based on the per unit output
production.
3.1.3.1 Non Drastic Case ( 0 < ε < 3 )
(i) S uppose the patentee decides to offer one license under royalty (r ) per unit of output. Due
to the competition of the licensee and non licensee rival firms in the third stage of the
 ε − r + 3
licensing game the patentee would receive the royalty revenue equal to r 
 . This
6



expression is maximized with the choice ε = r when ε ≤ 3 , i.e., if the technology is nondrastic. Thus by licensing to one firm under royalty the patentee receives

1
ε.
2

(ii) Suppose the patentee offers two licenses with a royalty rate r per unit of output. When
both the firms have the technology under royalty scheme their effective marginal cost of
production would be (c − ε + r ) . When both the firms have the same cost of production then
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each firm produces output equal

1
1
1
. Thus, the payoff to the patentee would be r + r = r
2
2
2

Now , given the natural restriction that the royalty payment cannot exceed the amount of cost
reduction ε we find that the payoff to the patentee is maximized when r = ε , and thus the
total royalty revenue becomes ε .
Lemma 3
By comparing the payoffs under royalty licensing, we find that licensing to two firms is better
than licensing to one firm when the innovation is non-drastic.
3.1.3.2 Drastic Case ( ε ≥ 3 )
(i) In case of drastic technology if the patentee offers to license one firm there are two
situations to consider. First, the royalty is such that the licensee firm is a monopoly in the
market and the second case is licensee competes with the non licensee and both operate in the
market. The non licensee would remain out of the market if royalty rate r ≤ ε − 3 . Thus , the
patentee can at the most get ε − 3 by charging the royalty optimally so that the non-licensee
is driven out of the market due to the cost advantages of the licensee even after royalty
payment. On the other hand if r > ε − 3 then the non-licensee would be able to compete in

 ε − r + 3
the market. In this situation the patentee receives r 
 . This unconstrained
6


ε +3
ε +3
maximization yields r = 
 . Since the optimal r = 
 has to be greater than ε -3
2


 2 

(i.e., the condition under which both firms operate in the market) we have the condition ε<9.
However, when ε ≥ 9 then to have the non licensee operating in the market the royalty rate
 ε − r + 3
must be high such that r > ε − 3 and as a result the patentee gets r 
.
6



maximum attainable payoff for the patentee is

So the

(ε + 3) 2
when 3 ≤ ε < 9 . However for ε >9 the
24

maximum attainable payoff to the patentee is at the most (ε − 3) in the limit. Now comparing
the payoff under different royalty rate and the subsequent market outcome in terms whether
one firm or two firms operate in the market we find the following outcome. For 3 ≤ ε < 9 , the
 ε + 3
optimal royalty rate is r = 
 and both firm operates in the market and the patentee
 2 

9

(ε + 3) 2
receives
. On the other hand for ε ≥ 9 the n it is optim al for the patentee to charge
24

r = ε − 3 and the whole market is served by the licensee only.
(ii) Now offering the drastic technology to both firms under royalty the patentee can expect to
get r.1 . This payoff is maximized when r = ε . Thus, ε is the optimal payoff when the drastic
technology is given to both firms under royalty licensing. Now by comparing the payoff
from licensing to one firm and two firms we find that the technology is given to both firms at
a royalty rate ε . One interesting point to note here is that even in the case of dr astic
innovation both firms will be licensed at a royalty rate equal to the amount of cost reduction.
This feature is something which was never shown before in the literature with an outsider
patentee case.
Thus, we summarize the royalty policy of the outside patentee.

Lemma 4
By comparing the payoffs under royalty licensing, we find that licensing to two firms is
better than licensing to one firm when the innovation is drastic .
Here, we summarize the outcome under the royalty policy.

Proposition 3
Under royalty policy, the patentee always offers two licenses as opposed to one irrespective
of the amount of cost reduction and in both drastic and non -drastic innovation the patentee
receives ε .
Now by comparing the outcomes depicted in Propositions 1, 2, and 3 we find that if the
patentee opts for royalty, both in drastic as well as non-drastic case it receives ε , whereas in
either of other two licensing modes (auction and fixed fee) its gets

2
ε for non-drastic
3

innovation and (ε − 1) for drastic innovation. Thus, we have the main result of this section.
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Proposition 4
(i)

In the case of outsider patentee, it is always better for the patentee to license out
the technology to bo th firms in the market using a royalty contract as compared to
either auction or fixed fee.

(ii)

Two firms get licensed under royalty, where as one firm gets licensed in auction
or fixed fee.

Here it is important to note that in optimal royalty licensing, under drastic innovation, both
firms are licensed by the patentee. This is a result that has never been shown in the literature
before with an outsider patentee.

4. The Case of Insider Patentee
Let’s assume pre-innovation marginal costs of the firms are c A = c B = c . Firm A comes up
with a cost reducing innovation, which lowers its marginal cost by ε > 0 , so that postinnovation c A = c − ε and cB = c .

4.1 No Licensing
When firm A does not license its technology to firm B and both firms compete, then we have
the following.
4.1.1 Non Drastic Case ( 0 < ε < 3 )

DA =
πA =

3+ε
3−ε
and DB =
;
6
6

(3 + ε )2
18

and π B =

(3 − ε )2

(4)

18

4.1.2 Drastic Case (ε ≥ 3 )

DA = 1 and DB = 0 ;
pA = c −1
π A = (ε − 1) and π B = 0

(5)

Note that under drastic case: π A ≥ 2 .
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4.2 The Licensing Game
A licensing game consists of three stages. In the first stage, the patent holding firm A sets a
fixed licensing fee or a royalty rate. 5 In the second stage, the other firm B decides whether to
accept or reject the offer from firm A. In the last stage, both firms compete in prices. Firm A
sets fixed fee or royalty rate in order to maximize the sum of the profit from its own
production and the licensing revenue.

4.2.1 Fixed Fee Licensing
First consider licensing by means of a fixe d fee only. Under the fixed fee licensing, firm A
licenses its cost reducing technology to firm B at a fixed fee F (say), which is invariant of the
quantity firm B produces using the new technology. The maximum license fee firm A can
charge firm B, is what will make firm B indifferent between having the license and not
having the license of the new technology. In case the licensing occurs, both firms will
produce at the same marginal cost of (c − ε ) .
4.2.1.1 Non Drastic Case ( 0 < ε < 3 )
If licensing takes place, each firms’ profit, π A = π B =

1
2

1 (3 − ε )
−
(using (3))
2
18
2

Therefore, F =

Hence, total profit of firm A under fixed fee licensing is;
π FA =

1
(3 − ε )
+ F = 1−
2
18

2

(6)

4.2.1.2 Drastic Case ( ε ≥ 3 )

F=

1
1
−0=
(using (4))
2
2

Hence, total profit of firm A under fixed fee licensing is;

π AF =

1 1
+ =1
2 2

(7)

Now comparing (4) and (6) as well as (5) and (7) we get the following.

5

The case of auction does not arise here since there is just one firm to license.

12

Proposition 5
Both under non-drastic and drastic innovation , offering no license to the rival is better for the
patentee than offering a fixed fee licensing.

This result is interesting because in the situation where the patentee is also a competitor in the
product market, and the competition takes place in price, there will be no fixed fee licensing.
This happens exactly because of the nature of price competition. When the patentee offers a
fixed fee license to the rival, both the patentee and the licensee compete on equal footing, and
the price competition results a low profit to both firms. As a result, the patentee cannot charge
a high fixed fee from its rival because the difference between the competing profit and the
reservation payoff becomes small. On the other hand, if the patentee does not license the
rival, it can hold a significant cost advantage when it shares the market with rival in the nondrastic case, which enables the patentee to get a significantly higher profit. On the other hand,
in the case of drastic innovation the patentee actually serves the whole market just as a
monopoly and naturally gets a high profit. Thus offering no license is better than offering a
fixed fee licensing when the patentee c ompetes with the rival in price. This is in contrast with
a similar situation when the competition takes place in quantities where under certain
parametric configuration fixed fee licensing is actually better than no licensing (see Wang,
1998).

4.2.2 Royalty Licensing
Under a royalty licensing, firm A licenses its new technology to firm B at a royalty rate r
(say), and the amount of total royalty firm B pays will depend on the quantity firm B
produces using the new technology. In this case, firm A’s margin al cost of production is

(c − ε )

and firm B’s marginal cost of production becomes

(c − ε + r )

if firm B buys the

license. Note that the maximum royalty that firm A can charge is ε (i.e. 0 < r ≤ ε ).
Now, if firm B buys the license at a royalty rate r then DB =
Note that for DB ≥ 0 , we must have r ≤ 3
Firm A’s profit from competing is: π A

2
(
3 + r)
=

18

13

3− r
(using (2))
6

4.2.2.1 Non Drastic Case ( 0 < ε < 3 )
Firm A’s total profit under royalty licensing is:

π

R
A

=

(3 + r )2
18

Hence, π

R
A

3−r 
+ r
 , which is maximum when r = ε (< 3) .
 6 

2
(
3+ε)
=

18

3−ε 
+ε 

 6 

(8)

4.2.2.2 Drastic Case ( ε ≥ 3 )
Firm A’ total profit under royalty licensing is:
π AR =

(3 + r )2
18

3−r 
+ r

 6 

Unconstrained maximization of the above expression with respect to r, gives r * = 3 .75
Note that π AR is a concave function in r and it is increasing for r < 3.75 .
Also recall that DB ≥ 0 , when r ≤ 3 . Hence (constrained) optimal r * in the drastic case is 3.
Thus, π AR =

(3 + 3 )2
18

+ 3.0 = 2

(9)

Now compa ring (4) and (8) as well as (5) and (9) we have the following.

Proposition 6
Offering royalty licensing is superior to offering no license for the patentee when the
innovation is non-drastic, while offering no license is superior to royalty when the innovation
is drastic.

In the case of non-drastic innovation royalty licensing turns out to be optimal since by
charging an appropriate per unit royalty, the patentee can hold its cost advantage when it
competes and at the same time collects the extra revenue coming from royalty. Whereas in
the case of drastic innovation, the revenue from royalty part goes to zero, because the optimal
royalty rate becomes so high, the rival chooses to produce nothing. In this case, the patentee
can do better by offering no license at all.

14

5. Incentive for Innovation
Now we focus our attention to one of the much debated issue in innovation and licensing
literature , namely the incentive for innovation. In particular, we are interested to compare the
incentive for innovation in two cases depending whether the innovator is an insider or an
outsider. Note that the incentive for innovation is what an agent expects as a gain in payoff
from undertaking innovation.
First in the case of insider innovator , the incentive for non-drastic innovation is given
by the difference between its payoff under innovation and selling the license license with the
pre-innovation payoff under old technology, which is given by

(3 + ε )2
18

3−ε  1
+ε 
− .
 6  2

1
While the incentive for drastic innovation is given by (ε − 1) − . Recall that in the drastic
2

case, the innovator does not license.
On the other hand, an outsider patentee always receives a payoff of ε from the
innovation followed by licensing, irrespective of the fact the innovation is drastic or non
drastic.
Hence, comparing the two payoffs in these two cases we find the following.

Proposition 7
Irrespective of the nature of innovation, the incentive for innovation is always higher when
the patentee is an outsider as opposed to an insider.

This is an interesting feature of our analysis. It is clear from Kamien and Tauman (2002) that
in Cournot market structure with the number of firm being 2 the incentive for innovation is
higher for an incumbent innovator than an outsider innovator. In the present context, we get
the opposite result.

6. Welfare Analysis
In this section, we highlight the welfare implications of an innovation depending on whether
the innovation is brought about by an insider patentee or an outside r patentee. First consider
the case of outsider patentee. In the case of outsider patentee we have seen that the optimal
licensing policy is to offer a royalty to both firms with the optimal royalty being the amount
of cost reduction. It is easy to see from the price equation (1) that the price of the product
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remains the same as in pre-innovation stage for any innovation under the optimal royalty
contract. As a result the consumers are not benefited by the innovation. From equation (3) we
also find that the profit of the two firms operating in the market remains the same as they
were getting prior to the innovation. Thus the entire surplus is appropriated by the outsider
patentee and it receives the payoff ε , whic h is the amount of cost reduction. Thus we have
the following proposition.

Proposition 8
When the patentee is an outsider, both the consumer surplus and producer surplus remains
unaffected i.e. they remain the same in pre-innovation and post innovation stage. The whole
gain due to the technology innovation accrues to the patentee and the amount of surplus
generated in the market is ε for any degree of cost reduction ε.
Now, let us consider the case of insider patentee. Note that the price prevailing in the market
prior to the innovation is p = c + 1 (from (1)) and the profit of each firm is

1
(from (3)).
2

Now there are two cases to consider depending on the magnitude of innovation.
Consider the case of non-drastic innovation first, i.e. when (0 < ε < 3) . We have seen that in
this non-drastic case the incumbent patentee would offer the license to its rival under royalty
and there fore it would receive the total payoff (from (8))

of the licensee would be

(3 − ε )2
18

(3 + ε )2
18

 3 −ε 
+ε 
 and the profit
 6 

. Prices charged by the incumbent innovator and the

2ε 
ε


licensee are given by  c + 1 −  and  c + 1 −  respectively.
3
3



Lemma 5
The change in consumer su rplus and producer surplus after innovation and licensing are
given by

ε ε
ε ε
1 +  > 0 and 1 −  > 0 respectively when the innovation is non -drastic.
2
9
2
9

Proof: See appendix.
Hence, change in total welfare is given by ε > 0 .

16

On the other hand, in case of drastic innovation (i.e. when ε ≥ 3) , the insider patentee would
not offer any license and would charge a price (c − 1) and receive a payoff of (ε − 1) .

Lemma 6
The change in consumer surplus and producer surplus after innovation are given by 2 and

(ε − 2 ) respectively when the innovation is drastic.
Proof: See appendix.
Hence , change in total welfare is given by ε > 0.
Proposition 9
In the case of in sider patentee the consumer surplus as well as producer surplus (i.e. total
industry profit) are higher compared to the pre-innovation stage for any magnitude of cost
reducing innovation (drastic or non-drastic) although the licensee’s profit declines in the
post innovation period. Moreover, due to innovation (drastic or non -drastic), the total
increase in society’s welfare is ε .6
Now comparing proposition 8 and 9, we get the following important result.

Propositio n 10
Total surplus generated due to innovation i.e. the positive change in welfare from preinnovation stage to post innovation stage is always the same (which is ε here, the amount of
cost reduction) irrespective of the fact the patentee is an outsider or an insider in each of the
drastic and non-drastic case.

We find this result is really striking and very robust. This allows the policy recommendations
very simple and straight forward. Given a degree of innovation, the policy on advocating an
outsider or an insider patentee is neutral. From society’s point of view this does not make any
difference whatsoever.7 Although, the consumers are better off if the innovation comes from

Note that in the non-drastic case 0 <ε < 3 and in the drastic case ε ≥ 3 .
Of course, as we show before, the incentive to innovate for any degree of cost reduction is always higher for
the outsider patentee as compared to insider patentee.
6
7
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the insider patentee. The consumer surplus does not change from the pre -innovation stage
when the innovation is done by an outsider patentee.

7. Conclusion
In this paper, we focus on the optimal licensing strategy of an outsider patentee as well as an
insider patentee in a spatial competition. In the case of outsider patentee, we show that
auction and fixed fee yield equivalent payoff to the patentee, and only one of the competitors
is offered with the license irrespective of the nature of innovation i.e. drastic or non-drastic.
On the other hand, in the case of royalty licensing both the competing firms are offered with
the license irrespective of the nature of innovation. Moreover, royalty licensing turns out to
be better compared to auction or fixed fee as it always yields higher payoff to the patentee. In
the case of outsider patentee, we also find the interesting result that the licensing takes place
even if the innovation is drastic. We believe this a new result in the literature. In the case of
insider patentee with a rival competitor, we find licensing by means of royalty is superior to
no licensing or fixed fee licensing to the patentee when the innovation is non-drastic. When
the innovation is drastic no licensing is optimal to the patentee. We also focus our attention to
the issue of incentive for innovation and show that in a spatial framework like this,
irrespective of the nature of innovation i.e. drastic or non-drastic, incentive for innovation is
always higher for an outsider patentee compared to an insider patentee. Our welfare analysis
shows tha t total (positive) change in welfare due to innovation is independent of the fact that
the patentee is outsider or insider in each of the drastic and non-drastic case. Although, we
find consumers are better off if the innovation comes from an insider patentee as opposed to
an outsider patentee.
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Appendix :
Non-Drastic Case:
The pre-innovation price is given by p = c + 1 , and the post-innovation price for patentee and
the licensee are given by p P = c + 1 −

2ε
ε
and p L = c + 1 − (using (1)).
3
3

Since the prices of the of the patentee and the licensee are different, the position of the
marginal consumer who is indifferent between going to either of the firm is given by

1 ε
1 +  . We work out the total change in consumer surplus in the following way. First we
2 3
 1  1 1  ε   1  ε  
divide the unit interval in the following three regions: 0 , ,  , 1 +  ,  1 + ,1 .
 2 2 2  3   2  3  
To derive the change in CS in each interval we multiply reduction in price (due to innovation)
with the length of the interval. Recall consumers are uniformly distributed over the unit
interval.
Total change in CS =

Total change in PS =

ε ε
1 + 
2
9

(3 + ε )2
18

3−ε 
+ε 
+
 6 

(3 − ε )
18

2

−1 =

ε ε
1 −  .
2
9

Hence, change in total welfare = change in CS + change in PS = ε
Drastic Case:
The pre-innovation price is given by p = c + 1 , and the post-innovation price for the patentee
is given by p = (c − 1) .
Thus, total change in CS = 2
The pre-innovation profit of each firm is given by

1
, and the post-innovation profit for the
2

patentee is (ε − 1)
Total change in PS = (ε − 2) .
Hence, change in total welfare = change in CS + change in PS = ε
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